E. Scotus’ own Opinion

490. I say to the question, therefore, that among the changes possible in the Eucharist some (1) stand while the Eucharist remains, some (2) do not. None of the first require the substance to return, not by divine action nor by action of a natural agent, and in fact the substance does not return. But of the second some (3) do not require the substance to return, yet (4) it does by divine action return; so that there are four conclusions.

491. The first is proved thus: every agent having power for some change has power for the term of it, provided it has a receptive subject no more repugnant to the term than to the motion. But in changes where the Eucharist remains, a natural agent has power for the whole motion, and the receptive subject is no more repugnant to the term than to the motion.     Therefore etc     .

492. The minor is plain, because the receptive subject cannot be said to be the quantity here; and one degree of quality to which there can be alteration or change is no more repugnant to the quantity than is another more imperfect degree according to which, and according to others like it, there can be a motion of alteration; for quantity in its idea does not determine any degree of quality for itself.

Thus is the first conclusion plain, that, while the Eucharist remains, there is no need for the substance to return.

493. And the third conclusion [n.490] can be proved by the same point, that change corruptive of the Eucharist, while yet the same quantity remains there that is the subject of the change, does not require the substance to return.

494. The proof of the second conclusion [n.490] is that, while the Eucharist remains, only the substance of the body of Christ is there - for the accidents then remain without a subject. But neither of these would be true if another substance were to return; therefore, while the Eucharist remains, no substance in fact returns.

495. The fourth conclusion is unlike the second, and it is this: that if the Eucharist is corrupted either by alteration or by motion in quantity, the substance in fact returns; and this is composite substance, to which such accidents belong, which also they affect; and it returns in the instant of corruption and immediately from God.

496. The proof of the first part of this conclusion [n.495] is that God has established that the species, while they remain, exist in the Eucharist precisely, and not elsewhere, without a subject;     therefore etc     . He has established, then, that when the Eucharist ceases, the species are not there without a subject, and consequently that in the very instant of corruption some substance is there.

497. The proof of the second part [n.495] is that if a substance does return there, yet not one different from that which can be affected by the new accidents, because a different substance would not be able to be so affected.

498. The proof of the third part [n.495], namely that it only returns immediately from God, is because no other agent has the active virtue sufficient for this.

499. A composite substance does not return, therefore, while the accidents of the Eucharist remain uncorrupt, as the first opinion says [n.452]; nor does the matter, as the second opinion says, return at the end by being repaired or by being created, because this would be altogether superfluous, since no action of a natural agent [nn.464-465] could be preserved in that form; nor does it return because, as the third opinion says [n.473], dimension is in some way susceptive of substantial form; nor is the possibility, the way the fourth opinion speaks [n.485], anything or convertible into anything.

500. But what change could come about while the Eucharist remains? It is plain that any alteration could that nothing is induced by incompossible with bread (were it to remain), and that any change in quantity could, either per se, as breaking or division (because the homogeneous parts of bread would be of nature to remain under the parts of divided quantity); or in quantity concomitantly, as in the case of rarefaction and densification, provided however a quantity is not induced that is repugnant to the substance of non-converted bread.

501. By contrast, however, corruptive change is to a quality to the degree in which the quality could not stand along with bread (if it were to remain), and this although the quantity remains altogether the same; such change, I say, cannot be brought about while the Eucharist remains, or at least is not in fact brought about. Hence, if it were possible for the heat of fire to be induced in the consecrated species to a degree repugnant to bread (were it present), and yet the quantity that was before remained altogether the same, the Eucharist would be corrupted; because the Eucharist does not consist in quantity alone but in other accidents necessarily consequent to converted substances; and consequently, in the inducing of the incompossible heat, the substance would in fact return, as was proved in the fourth conclusion [nn.495-496].

502. But it would not be necessary for substance to return because of the action of a natural agent, as the third conclusion says [n.493]; for a natural agent would have for subject the quantity into which the heat could be induced, as the proof of the third and fourth conclusion proves [nn.491-493]; and then a quantum hot with fiery heat would be there, and yet fire would not be there.